The Northern Irish Conflict and the European Convention On Human Rights 1950

This blog is aimed at discussing and considering in summary, the contents of the E-book “The Northern Irish Conflict and the ECHR 1950” Part Three, by John A Coyle. This e-book is part three of five parts. In essence, Article 17 ECHR 1950 states as follows:

ARTICLE 17 – Prohibition of abuse of rights

Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.

Article 17 provides that no one may use the rights guaranteed by the Convention to seek the abolition or limitation of rights guaranteed in the Convention. This addresses instances where States seek to restrict a human right in the name of another human right, or where individuals rely on a human right to undermine other human rights (for example where an individual issues a death threat). Alternatively, for example, to pursue a pre-planned policy of using the ECHR 1950 as a “Sword or Shield,” for political or security purposes. In essence, an examination of a range of cases involving Article 17 ECHR 1950, in the first instance is as to eligibility, scope and accessibility criterion issues. I.E. scope, accessibility, negation and as an aid to interpretation. Ultimately a Court determination in terms of Article 17 being applied or dis-applied; and or relied on or not relied on; and or used by the Court, as an aid to interpretation. There appears to be a reluctance by the Court to apply Article 17 ECHR 1950, if a decision or ruling can in the first instance be grounded on the facts and circumstances supporting the claimants substantive Article, for which human rights protection is sought. That is, with a view to a negation of the claimants substantive ECHR 1950 rights. This is usually in terms of the substantive Article right, being manifestly ill-founded. Alternatively, Article 17 may be relied on or not relied, usually on the basis of proportionality or disproportionality.

In this context, as discussed above, there have been different uses of Article 17 ECHR 1950 which appear to be moving back and forward in two directions? It is debatable as to whether Article 17 ECHR 1950, is capable of being applied, as both a “Shield” and or a “Sword” in the application / dis-application and interpretation of Article 17 ECHR 1950? The perception is that Article 17 ECHR 1950 is a “shield” against abuses and misuses, aimed at undermining the working operation ECHR 1950. This is by way of ill-founded and mischievous human rights claims, supported and protected by the substantive Articles of ECHR 1950.

The role of the UK judiciary and or European Court of Human Rights, in adjudicating these cases, may or may not differ, as to the accessibility or scope of Article 17 ECHR 1950? A UK domestic Court interpretation may differ from an international human rights jurisprudence interpretation? However, for example, if the Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland, only prefer charges against individual British service personnel or individual former RUC personnel; and or individual members of the NI administration of justice. The British domestic Courts will in all probability apply the criminal law code and ECHR 1950 Articles, relative to the Human Rights Act 1998. The British domestic Courts may or may not invoke Article 17 ECHR 1950, if they so choose to do so. However, they may not feel the need to do so. If a human rights claim by the defendants, can be demonstrated to be defeated on the facts and circumstances of the individual case, relative to the ECHR 1950 substantive Article for which the human rights protection is sought. Thereby, resulting in the substantive ECHR 1950 Article, being declared irrelevant; and or manifestly ill founded? If the British domestic Court is unable to arrive at a decision this way. It may in order to preserve judicial integrity and the independence of the Court, to rule on the invocation of Article 17 ECHR 1950? This may prove difficult for example, if the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland, have not pleaded; and or advanced or responded to a submission argument, in relation to an Article 17 ECHR 1950 abuse of rights. IE. in conjunction with a substantive Article of ECHR 1950 human rights protection? This may be unlikely to take place this side of the High Court hearing and therefore only possible on appeal? This position may therefore, be unlikely unless the High Court is permitted to invoke Article 17 ECHR 1950, in relation to any specified substantive Article of ECHR 1950 human rights protection sought? Moreover, as discussed in the above text, the issue as to HMG public authority joint venture; and or criminal conspiracy / joint and several responsibility / liability, for decisions and actions, to whom individual members of the British service personnel; and or the former RUC were accountable and responsible too. I.E. may or may not afford any domestic British Court less difficulty, if there is a need real or perceive and is permissible to invoke Article 17 ECHR 1950, abuse of Convention rights, by British service personnel; and or the former RUC; and HMG Civil servants in the MOD or administration of justice? It is not inconceivable that if these issues are not adjudicated on, in the UK domestic courts, the issues may be raised via an appeal or claim to the European Court of Human Rights, in any event? It may be that he European Court of Human Rights may either decide on the basis of establishing the ECHR 1950 substantive Article right; and or apply or dis-apply any Article 17 ECHR 1950? This may or may not involve the invocation of Article 17 ECHR 1950. I.E. on a joint public authority and British Service personnel / former RUC perpetrator basis? However, if this is the European Court of Human Rights, direction of travel, it may or may not be because the competing and conflicting issues are countervailing; and or are therefore perceived, as a matter which is better handled, under the ECHR 1950 friendly settlement / enforcement processes?

The ECHR 1950 is underpinned in ideological and conceptual terms, which are perceived as being fundamental, as to a non-negotiable ECHR 1950, sense of purpose and meaning. In particular, issues revolving around perceptions of values and concepts which may possess a conflicting or competing countervailing consequence? For example, the concept of “defending democracy”, “peace and justice,” “pluralism”; and or “taking steps” to “defend democracy”, past and present conduct, individual and institutional, decisions and actions, in relation to the “vindication of humanity”. Any State, groups or individual activities at variance with these values may therefore, satisfy the first stage criterion as to accessibility to Article 17 dis-application of specified substantive ECHR 1950 rights. The second stage criterion may or may not be satisfied, if the decisions and actions of any such State, group or individual, is at variance with these values and is verifiably identified, as intent on engaging in any activities or performing any acts, aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms; and in or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the ECHR 1950. A third stage may or may not involve a requirement to be cognisant as to the “situational positioning” of individuals, institutional; and or in a community context of unlawful discrimination; and or disempowerment. I.E. relative to any system of democracy, based on the “rule of law,” for which there is a resulting passive participation, together with any compensating factors, such as a written constitution which protects civil liberties, or equality of treatment, or human rights. This may for example, be in the form of the Canadian Charter of Rights or the USA Constitutions, Bill of Rights, or the Irish Constitution, or the German Constitution or the European Charter of Fundamental Rights or the Constitution of South Africa. In the UK there is the common law principles in the form of the “rules of natural justice”, the “judges rules”, a range of selective protective legislation. For example, the UK Equality Act, The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1986, and number of employment law and unlawful discrimination acts protecting gender, race, sexual orientation, rehabilitation of ex offenders, disability discrimination rights; and from 1998 the UK has incorporated the ECHR 1950, into the domestic law of the UK, via the Human Rights Act 1998. In this context, it will be appreciated that the development of constitutional and human rights, even in a “rule of law” democracy, is an evolutionary process. A great deal of UK constitutional legislation may be entirely; and or in parts now incompatible with the ECHR 1950? For example, from the Magna Charta 1215 to a range of UK Acts of Union and Settlements, the Statute of Westminster? The absence of these constitutional and human rights developments, may be an important consideration, in relation to Article 17 ECHR 1950, accessibility criterion. In particular, as to any suggestion of verifiably identified issues, as to an intent, which may or may not be part of a perceived constructive second stage of this type of criterion process? In particular, during the Anglo-Irish / NI Conflict 1968-1998, in a political and security conflict, in which there were unequal power relations; and the more powerful British State had a vested political, economic and security interests, rendering HMG to be not impartial arbiters, in an unequal power relations conflict? I.E. in which HMG were and still are a political protagonist and therefore not neural? Indeed, where it can be demonstrated, via a verifiable litany of bad conduct, bad faith abuse of rights and lawful processes, decisions, actions and government polices and practices; and or an absence of laws or policies, over a period of approximately one hundred year plus?

In essence, a competing, conflicting and countervailing political and security engagement process, under the pretext of the “defence of democracy” underpinned by a system of jurisprudence based on the Common law of England. Also set within a framework of social, economic and cultural limitations. Moreover, ancillary too and emanating out of the imposition of an Anglo- Saxon ruling class “cultural feudalism”. Aimed at facilitating the preservation of a particular way of life, which is enabled by the an embedded language and discourse, which promotes inequalities. As a direct and indirect consequence, resulting in distorted perceptions and producing a false consciousness, supporting a misleading political and security narrative. Thereby, also undermining human social and emotional cognitions? The outcome is the direct and indirect abuse of human rights, resulting in the restricting, limiting the ECHR 1950 Articles, designed to protect human rights? Regrettably, therefore, attempting to defend the indefensible, at variance with the “vindication of humanity”, without a viable, open and transparent good faith, objective justification?

It is noteworthy, in this connection that during the Anglo-Irish / NI Conflict 1968-1998, the aforementioned common law, constitutional and civil liberties and human rights, were not an operational component of the UK law? In particular, in the context of the Anglo-Irish / NI Conflict 1968-1998 and in relation to the HMG policy of “Criminalisation” under the pretext of a protracted public emergency, supported by emergency legislation, for the scheduling of criminal offences and supported and adjudicated by the Special Diplock Courts system. As discussed this was regardless of the fact that approximately 90 percent of those NI British subjects, brought before the Special Diplock Courts, were not charged with membership of a proscribed unlawful paramilitary / terrorist organisation? This HMG policy of “Criminalisation” in response to NI conflict related political violence, was supported by a clear unequivocal political intention to derogate from HMG human rights responsibilities, under Article 15 of the ECHR 1950? The suspension of the revised 1968 “Judges Rules” until October 1976, during a period of a dual set of emergency provisions, in the form of internment without trial and the emergency scheduled criminal offences, supported and adjudicated by the Special Diplock Courts, may have been unlawful in real time? Clearly, in the absence of civil liberties and human rights protections. It is a civil liberties and human rights imperative, that the ECHR 1950, human rights protections come into play. In particular, as discussed ECHR 1950 substantive Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13 and 14. Moreover, with the HMG political intention, thereafter to incorporate the ECHR 1950 into UK domestic law. I.E. with a view to being employed, as either a “Sword or a Shield”. Clearly, at variance; and or in avoidance of the criminal prosecution of members of the former RUC and or British Army; and or other public authorities, such as the Special Diplock Courts, the UK and NI Public Prosecution / Probation Services, the NI administration of justice, forensic science service departments, MOD, NI Office, Access NI / DBS public authorities / agencies? Thereby, amounting to an engagement in any activity or performing any act, aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the ECHR 1950. Therefore, all of these types of decisions and actions of HMG; and or their public authorities / agents, during the Anglo-Irish / NI conflict 1968-1998, may or may not potentially be examples for consideration, in relation, to attempts at the abolition, destruction or limitation of rights guaranteed under Article 17 of the ECHR 1950. Thereby, potentially satisfying an ECHR 1950 prohibition of abuse of rights criteria?

In relation to the past Anglo-Irish / NI conflict 1968-1998, it remains to be seen if the application of Article 17 ECHR 1950 will be activated in the event of British service personnel seeking human rights protections? In particular, in relation to substantive Article claims, in conjunction with Article 17 ECHR 1950 negations? For example, those British Army paratroopers / SAS regiments, involved in the direct or indirect killings both in Derry and Belfast; and the “shoot to kill” loss of life incidents? Indeed, or else where in Northern Ireland? It is debatable, if prior to the incorporation of ECHR 1950, into UK domestic law; and or the post Belfast Agreement 1998, and the subsequent transportation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1986, into the law of Northern Ireland. If indeed, any security service personnel would have been pursued, by the former RUC and or the NI Public Prosecution Service? In this connection, it has taken between thirty and fifty years for the suppressed facts to be independently investigated; and for these facts to be put into the public domain? Clearly, British security personnel and former RUC officers, and those involved in the NI administration of justice, are without question entitled to ECHR 1950 human rights protections. At least if only because the ECHR 1950 has retrospective legal mechanisms, as with those charged with NI conflict related offences? In this respect, there is very little evidence of any significant State investigation into British security personnel; and or the former RUC personnel, during the Anglo-Irish/ NI Conflict 1968-1998? In relation, to the cases brought against the former RUC and British Army, the sentencing component has been very dubious and politically controversial? Furthermore, it is not understood, if in raising an Article 17 negation, if indeed, British security personnel are able to plead guilty and put in a strong mitigation, to the effect, that they were acting on military or superior officer orders?; For example, conflicting instructions, such as “fire at will” or “only fire at identified armed targets”; and or if this approach may in some ways be circumvented by the British Official Secrets Acts and or any other public immunity, gagging laws, regulations and practices? HMG failures in their duty of care towards British security service men placed in an invidious situations; and or those security services informants? As discussed the issues and arguments raised may not be dissimilar from those raised against individuals or groups involved in NI proscribed unlawful paramilitary/ terrorist organisations? In the context of for example, "defending democracy", and or "taking steps to defend democracy", human rights concepts and values, violations of Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14; and a potential invalidated ECHR 1950, Article 15 HMG reliance? I.E. as a direct and indirect consequence, due to the conflicting and competing nature of HMG's policy of “Criminalisation” and HMG’s role as a political protagonist, with a political and security agenda of their own to serve? This together with all of the previously discussed litany of abuse of rights and lawful processes, the judges rules, the rules of natural justice, bad conduct, bad faith, cover ups, suppression of the truth for decades? The aforementioned range of the denial of human rights protections, to NI British Subjects, during the Anglo-Irish / NI Conflict 1968-1998? However, the real issue may be in relation to the potential perceptions, real or perceived. I.E. viewing all of HMG, decisions and actions of the individual British Service personnel, as being inextricably linked to the respective public authorities, to whom they were accountable and responsible too? In essence, a declaratory understanding, as to the proposition of a joint and several responsibility, as between HMG / MOD / Administration of Justice, as a public authority, for the purposes of the ECHR 1950? In particular, in the context of potential joint venture decisions and actions; and or corporate / British State culpable homicide / manslaughter?; and or joint venture criminal offences, against the administration of justice, such as perverting the course of justice, perjury, deceiving the court, fabrication of evidence, breaks in the chain of evidence; and or a range of joint venture criminal conspiracies? The carrying of legally held fire arms into police interview / interrogation rooms; and or firearm exhibits, which are not in sealed evidence bags? Thereby, affording the potential for intimidating and threatening suspected NI British Subjects, in the absence of a solicitor; and or an appropriate adult? It is noteworthy, some of these behaviours may also be the out workings of evolved workplace / institutional cultures and arbitrary behaviours and practices? I.E. failures in due diligence; and or non compliance with regulations? The unequivocal circumstance of unequal power relations, as between the joint and several liability of the HMG individual / groups security personnel and HMG public authorities, as to their respective representations, decision and actions, as being, also a shared joint / collective responsibility? This may be reasonably identified on the completion of probative investigative processes? I.E. in terms of being proved on the balance of probability, but it may be difficult to prove this relationship beyond a reasonable doubt? Clearly, in a circumstance of unequal power relations and competing and conflicting HMG political and security policy, decisions and actions? It may be difficult for HMG to demonstrate any objective justification, for the separating; and or distancing themselves from HMG joint and several decisions and actions of the British security personnel, during the Anglo-Irish / NI Conflict 1968-1998? This may also involve direct or indirect consequences in to include the unlawful HMG security personnel decisions and actions which were not supported by law? Thereby, having to concede to ECHR 1950 equality of arms, human rights protections? However, it may or may not be permissible to support a partial claim invoking a ECHR 1950 Article 17, negation of human rights, at a state public authority level? However, in the absence of an unequivocal individual unlawful behaviour. There should not be an adverse "criminalisation" impact on individual British security personnel, not acting as the prime mover, but only on an equivocal basis, with due diligence; and or on or under express orders, in the course of their lawful duties? Therefore, it is suggested that any violation of human rights claims, in relation to British security personnel, must be two fold containing two limbs. I.E. one in connection with the individual British security service personnel; and two, in relation to the appropriate HMG public authority? For example HMG MOD or Administration of justice / Ministry of Justice? It is without question a human rights imperative, that individual British security personnel are capable of vindicating their individual human rights also. There will of course, no doubt be those who will say that, NI British Subjects, were denied their civil liberties and human rights, during the Anglo-Irish / NI Conflict 1968-1998 and charged with emergency provision, scheduled criminal offences and brought before the Special Diplock Courts? So why should British security personnel not be treated the same, especially since approximately 90% of these NI British Subjects, were not charged with membership of a proscribed unlawful paramilitary / terrorist organisation? Moreover, the legal position on appeal for those convicted of NI conflict related scheduled criminal offences, was the judicial process, is confined to the law existing, at the time of the alleged commission of the emergency scheduled criminal offence. The answer, is simple, those NI British Subjects, denied access to a solicitor; and or an appropriate adult; and to receive a fair trial by a properly constituted criminal court, with the regular rules of evidence and disclosure rules, should not have been? Therefore, British Security personnel are without question, likewise entitled to ECHR 1950 protections? This is supported by ECHR case law decisions, as discussed in part three of the text. This is regardless of walking free for the past thirty to fifty years? However, it may be noteworthy, that an individual; and or a public authority for the purposes of ECHR 1950, does not have to be found guilty of any domestic or international crime, in order to be found to be in violation of the human rights protected by the ECHR 1950. Moreover an end to the NI conflict related inquiries and criminal and civil investigations, via a UK domestic law, statute of limitations, does not mean an end to ECHR 1950 investigation rights; and or the European Court of human rights adjudications; and or the friendly settlement / enforcement processes of the Convention On Human Rights 1950.

In this connection, there may or not be a potentially significant competing and conflicting law and practice dilemma? This is arising from the incorporation of the ECHR 1950, into UK domestic law, albeit via the Human Rights Act 1998. This may be because of HMG’s competing and conflicting policy of "Criminalisation" under the assertion; and or political and security pretext of a temporary public emergency. I.E, during the entire Anglo-Irish / NI Conflict 1968-1998? In a circumstance of unequal power relations, in which HMG were not neutral or impartial arbiters, but rather political and security protagonists? The charging of British security personnel with criminal offences, emanating from the past NI conflict, amounting to acting unlawfully; and or acting without the support of laws; and or acting beyond the emergency lawful powers? These may involve a range of individual criminal offences, against identified individual members of the British security services personnel. I.e. as distinct from that of the public authorities, to whom they are legally responsible and accountable too? The Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland, therefore may or may not have any standing to raise Article 17 ECHR 1950, as to human rights abuses, revolving around the institutional relationship of British security personnel; and or the public authority for whom they are acting on behalf of and are accountable and responsible too? It may be necessary for the NI Public Prosecution Service, to seek a European Court of Human Rights ruling, as to preferring criminal charges, either individually; and or jointly with the public authority I.E. to whom the individual British service personnel / former RUC are accountable and responsible too? It may or may not be an issue for the Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland, as a public authority for the purposes of ECHR 1950. I.E. if they choose not to take official legal advice, in order to mitigate against any failure to seek, such a High Court or European Court of Human Rights ruling? It may be important to remember that political organisations, which were said to be directly and indirectly linked to proscribed unlawful paramilitary / terrorist organisations, which were involved in paramilitary political violence, had some of their otherwise legitimate substantive human rights circumvented, via the invoking of Article 17 ECHR 1950, abuse of Convention rights; and or the actual substantive rights were deemed to be in any event ill-founded, within the confines of the primary claimed human rights violation? Likewise, it may be difficult to disassociate the litany of HMG abuse of lawful processes, bad conduct, bad faith; and or the HMG competing and conflicting political policies and security decisions and actions. I.E. During the entire Anglo-Irish / NI Conflict 1968-199? Regardless of the post Belfast Agreement 1998, and the incorporation of ECHR 1950, into Northern Ireland law issues. For example, at issue may be the denial ECHR 1950 Article 5 and 6 rights to British Army Parachute Regiment personnel by the Royal Military Police? I.E can British service personnel have their individual human rights under Article 5 and 6 ECHR 1950, challenged by the invocation of Article 17 ECHR 1950? I.E. due to the litany of established and verifiable HMG abuse of lawful processes, bad conduct, bad faith; and or the HMG competing and conflicting political policies and security decisions and actions, during the entire Anglo-Irish / NI Conflict 1968-1998? Is the Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland, going to even consider this avenue of prosecutorial procedure, in the vindication of ECHR 1950, human rights of all of NI British Subjects, for example those killed on "Bloody Sunday" in Derry or "Ballymurphy" in Belfast? Is the Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland, duty bound to act independently and be accountable and responsible, as a public authority for the purposes of the ECHR 1950?

The question going forward is? Is the door opening or closing to the enabling of further human rights conceptual developments, under Article 17 ECHR 1950. I.E, as to accessibility, scope, negation, interpretation, application, dis-application, relied on or not relied on, via objective justifications, in vindication of human rights? In particular, to enable the judicial decisions beyond not just considering specified aspects and arriving at an alternative judicial finding. The judicial development of a type human rights “Obiter dicta” capable of a persuasive conceptual criterion? This may be in relation to a set of countervailing facts and circumstances, that are underpinned by embedded competing and conflicting values, concepts, cultural, political, security, motivations and self-interests? Potentially Article 17 ECHR 1950, in conjunction with substantive Articles, may or may not be a developmental work in progress? As discussed to date the European Court of Human Rights, has resorted to Article 17 when dealing with issues under Articles 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 35, 3 (a) of the ECHR 1950 and Articles 1 and 3 of Protocol No. 1. Depending on the nature of a case, the Court can apply Article 17 directly or use it as a guide to interpretation.

The potential for human rights claims and an application to dis-apply, a claim by a state, individual and or group, in relation to applications seeking redress under Article 17 ECHR 1950, may prove to be a daunting and perplexing experience. In essence, working towards an understanding beyond the obvious accessibility eligibility; and or the fundamental values criterion of Article 17 ECHR 1950. In this context, appears to be only developing its potential in the direction of the vindication of substantive ECHR 1950 human rights protections I.E. in conjunction with Article 17 of the ECHR 1950. This is especially so, in the context of the human rights claims past and present, emanating out of the Anglo-Irish / NI Conflict 1968-1998. In particular, with regard to the pre partition of the island of Ireland, inconclusive political struggle and historic ongoing Irish political unrest. In terms of a changing and externally managed and manipulated political and human geography, on the island of Ireland. In essence, the Anglo-Saxon conquest of Ireland, is an in inconclusive political struggle and the latest Anglo-Irish / NI Conflict 1968-1998, is one of many rebellions; and or following on, as a consequence of the last rebellion? In this recent outworking stemming from the partition of the island of Ireland, by the British Government, against the democratic wishes of the Irish nation? It is therefore, of paramount importance to be cognisant, as to previous British and Irish cultural, political and constitutional history. This is essential when we think in terms of “defending democracy” and the concepts and values of “a rule of law democracy”. It is therefore, noteworthy, in this context to again consider the basis of the fundamental Universal Declaration on Human Rights. For the first time in international law, the term “the rule of law” was used in the preamble of the Declaration. The third paragraph of the preamble of the Declaration reads as follows:

"Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law."

Mindful of the salient human rights and freedoms realities in terms of what appears to be an ongoing conquest of Ireland and inconclusive political struggle. In essence, another rebellion in the British State of Northern Ireland, emanating out of a failed and deficient British system / mode of democracy? The “defence of democracy” and shifting and changing political and human geography. The consequences for social, economic and psychological well-being, is a significant issue in relation to the full implementation of the Belfast Agreement 1998. Indeed, for which the Human Rights Commission for Northern Ireland, is a significant institution supporting democracy. Therefore, the importance of the ECHR 1950, functional role of human rights redress, in relation to transitional justice and of human rights protections, both as to the past and going forward, cannot be overestimated. Please note. there is no attempt here or in any part of this text to justify political violence; and or rewrite the Anglo-Irish / NI Conflict 1968-1998. However, regard must be had in terms of a valued conceptual understanding, as to the “situational positioning” of the Northern Irish population, in an externally managed and manipulated conflict? Clearly, evidenced in parts one and two of this e-book, in terms of bad faith, bad conduct, abuse of rights and lawful processes; and or failures in a duty of care, disregard for psychological well-being; and a pre-planed policy of “Criminalisation”, at variance and in avoidance of human rights protections? Countervailing under the pretext of the “defence of democracy” and underpinned by a system of jurisprudence based on the Common law of England. Also set within a framework of social, economic and cultural limitations. Again, as considered above, emanating out of an imposition of an embedded Anglo- Saxon class system of “cultural feudalism”. Aimed at facilitating the preservation of a particular way of life, which is enabled by the an embedded language and discourse, which promotes inequalities, social exclusion, social control; and or coercive control and xenophobia. As a consequence resulting in distorted perceptions of self / identity, producing a false consciousness, and undermining social and emotional cognitions. The outcome is the direct and indirect restricting and limiting the human rights protected by the Articles of the ECHR 1950. Thereby, attempting to defend the indefensible; and or an incomplete or deficient mode of democracy. Clearly, at variance with the “vindication of humanity”, without a genuine or viable, good faith, objective justification?

As indicated and considered in the text to date the European Court of Human Rights has resorted to Article 17 when dealing with issues under Articles 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 35, 3 (a) of the ECHR 1950 and Articles 1 and 3 of Protocol No. 1. Depending on the nature of a case, the Court can apply Article 17 directly or use it as a guide to interpretation. The potential for human rights claims and an application to dis-apply a claim by a state, individual and or group, in relation to applications seeking redress under Article 17 ECHR 1950, may prove to be a daunting and perplexing experience. In essence, working towards an understanding beyond the obvious accessibility eligibility and criterion of Article 17 ECHR 1950, appears to be only developing its potential in the context of the vindication of substantive ECHR 1950 human rights protections I.E. in conjunction with Article 17 of the ECHR 1950. This is especially, so in the context of the human rights claims past and present emanating out of the Anglo-Irish / NI Conflict 1968-1998. In essence, this may be a new aspect of human rights territory? In particular, which may require the development of new thinking and conceptualisations, in relation to both separating and joining individual / group and state decisions and actions. In particular, those linked to Article 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14 and 15 complaints / derogations. I.E in conjunction with Article 17 ECHR 1950, applications; and or dis-application? A human rights work in progress, wherein the development is depending on the nature of a case, the Court can apply Article 17 directly; and or use it as a guide to interpretation. In this context, the process of using the Article 17 ECHR 1950, as a guide to interpretation, may or may not potentially, act as an enabling mechanism? I.E. Aimed at developing, a coherent inclusive and proportionate criterion? This is in relation, to a further judicial developments, with a view to considering, the separating and joining of both individual / group and state, decisions and actions? I.E where it is identified that the same set of facts and circumstances, are linked to applicable human rights violations of specified substantive Articles. I.E. the purpose for which, is to balance and protect the respective human rights guaranteed via ECHR 1950.